

**OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE – STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1
“CRITICAL FOOD NEEDS OF TARGETED GROUPS MET”**

**RESULTS REVIEW
FY 1998**

AND

**RESOURCE REQUEST
FY 2001**

**OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE – EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIVISION
BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

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Please Note:

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Subject: Strategic Objective 1: 1998 Results Review and Resource Request

The Office of Food for Peace is pleased to present the Emergency Response Division's annual Results Review and Resource Request (R4) for FY 1998. This report marks the completion of three years of implementing the Office of Food for Peace's Strategic Plan, 1997 – 2001.

We are again re-emphasizing the urgent need for USAID to resolve the issue of program staffing so that the Office of Food for Peace can effectively manage one of our most valued U.S. Government programs. As emergencies continue to increase in complexity and require food aid, the lack of staff means increased vulnerabilities of USAID to complaints and criticisms from implementing partners, donors, international agencies, and Congress.

PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

In Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, the United States provided 921,350 metric tons of Title II emergency food aid, valued at over \$481 million, to more than 22 countries, and reaching at least 16.4 million people. FY 1998 saw an increase of over 42 percent in the number of beneficiaries reached through emergency food aid from the previous year (11.5 million beneficiaries), and an increase of more than \$77 million in program requirements. Floods and droughts attributable to weather fluctuations related to the El Nino and La Nina weather phenomena caused significant disasters in several continents. The number of food-insecure people increased throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The international financial crisis was most severe in Asia, and affected countries not normally requiring food aid. In Indonesia, for example, the financial crisis compounded the impact of a food emergency initially related to weather patterns. Finally, conflict or post-conflict emergencies continue to demand a large proportion of Title II food aid.

A major factor that influences program performance continues to be human and non-program financial constraints outlined in the previous year's performance report. The straight-lined Operating Expense budget and staff levels with an increasing workload due to major catastrophes and labor-intensive complex emergencies present major management and performance challenges. In FY 1998, four Country Backstop Officers (CBOs) and three Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) managed over \$481 million of U.S. Title II emergency food aid.

The overall prospects for progress through the budget request year are difficult to assess, as the emergence of new disasters is unpredictable. Given the existing strain on human resources to deal with current emergencies of phenomenal proportion, the SO1 team will continue to attempt to meet critical food needs. However, without the personnel, operating expense, and Development Assistance resources requested, it cannot guarantee that responses will always be undertaken on a timely basis or that progress can be monitored for performance.

PART II: RESULTS REVIEW

Strategic Objective 1 (SO1) of the Office of Food for Peace is **“Critical food needs of targeted groups met”**. SO1 seeks to ensure that emergency food aid is provided to targeted populations. It seeks to maintain or improve the nutritional status of beneficiaries.

The SO1 team seeks to implement Title II emergency food aid using the “5 rights” approach: provide the right *food* to the right *people* in the right *place* (IR1), at the right *time* (IR2) and in the right *way* (IR3,IR4).

Summary Performance Statement

SO1 is on track. In spite of the difficult circumstances of Title II emergency food aid programming, the SO1 team *succeeded in improving both the measurement and the reporting of results by our partners*. Implementing partners continue to be engaged in the process initiated with the development of the Strategic Plan and the performance indicators for SO1 in late 1996/early 1997. Now performance indicators are incorporated into Transfer Authorizations and standardized grant documents for all new programs with our partners.

Although there are some exceptions, nutritional status as a primary impact indicator is accepted by implementing partners. Compared to last year, there is a significant increase in nutritional status data being provided as part of the performance reporting process.

The overall experience of U.S. PVO partners in reporting on performance is positive. At a January 1999 review meeting coordinated by Food Aid Management (FAM), the expanded SO1 team reviewed experience in collecting the performance indicators and the instrument (questionnaire) for collecting the data. The only modification recommended was to allow flexibility for programs to provide impact data other than nutritional status in some cases focusing on socio-economic indicators, household income and market analysis. PVOs were generally pleased with the process and the questionnaire, which is considered user-friendly, even by PVO field offices.

A main issue of concern for SO1 is transition programming. The relief-to-development framework is not applicable for all situations, as the assumption is that transition will lead to development. Transition Activities (TAP) may only be suitable for stable governments where programs have a chance to transition to development food aid. There may be a need to review the SO1 indicators as more transition-type programs are being implemented, perhaps including some of the SO1 and SO2 (development food aid) indicators for program management and reporting purposes.

Renewed dialogue on program and financial issues needs to be undertaken with the World Food Programme (WFP). This will help to ensure that its new standardized report for all donors meets the specific needs of SO1 performance monitoring.

The SO1 team *implemented several new measures* to improve performance and management of emergency food aid. Measures initiated in FY 1997 to improve program planning, the approval process, and food aid delivery were further tested and implemented. The introduction of standardized grant documents may facilitate the approval process for programs. A longer program planning cycle was introduced for transition countries in Africa, although recurring conflicts impede progress in moving to development. The SO1 team, with support from Mendez England & Associates (ME&A) and Global Bureau's Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANta), began to establish a database to monitor SO1 performance indicators.

With technical assistance from BHR/PPE and FANta, the SO1 team reviewed the nutritional content and feasibility of introducing a high-energy, fortified emergency biscuit for use during the initial phase of emergencies. The *Mainstay* biscuit is produced by a U.S. manufacturer which enables the procurement and use of this product for the first time in Title II emergency food aid programs. This product is currently being pilot tested for acceptability by end-users in the Kosovo crisis.

In FY 1998, the SO1 team pilot-tested pre-positioning of emergency food aid with an initial authorization of 9,600 metric tons of food commodities valued at just over \$6 million. This was used successfully to meet El Nino emergency food aid needs in Sudan and Somalia, and in Central America when Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Without this new measure, the time frame for food aid delivery is normally 120-150 days. The pre-positioning of food aid in U.S. ports, in preparation for sudden-onset emergencies, reduced the time to less than 30 days to provide critical food to selected locations. In some cases such as airlifts to Central America after Hurricane Mitch, this enabled overnight response.

Lastly, the SO1 team *exceeded the majority of its indicator targets* for FY 1998 (see Table 1). Similar to last year, it failed to reach the targets for addressing special needs of different targeted groups (IR1, #2) and reducing Title II pipeline shortages (IR2, #1). In addition, the target for IR4,#2 (percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results) was not reached. The latter is explained by the fact that this indicator is now modified to “percent of programs strengthening counterparts/local groups” through collaborative activities. Since all programs collaborate with local institutions for activity results, the SO1 team sought to understand whether the collaboration resulted in the actual strengthening of counterparts.

Of utmost concern to the SO1 team is the continued increase in Title II pipeline shortages (IR2, #1: food commodities not delivered per schedule as outlined in call-forwards). In FY 1998, 47 percent of programs experienced pipeline shortages, compared to 33 percent in FY 1997. When pre-positioning of food aid commodities was undertaken, as in Sudan, all programs reported receiving food aid on timely basis (within one to three months). However, pre-positioning of food aid is being undertaken only on a pilot basis in selected countries.

Based on limited information from implementing partners, delays were due to shipping transportation problems such as contractual or availability. Another reason cited by implementing partners was delay due to the Office of Food for Peace’s internal proposal review and funding approval process.

It was the SO1 team’s conclusion last year that IR2 (food aid delivered to target groups on schedule) would not be met without the requested level of human resources and development assistance funding. This year, the SO1 team concluded that, given historically high turnover rate of staff and the frequent need for “surge” capacity for emergencies, 11.5 full time Country Backstop Officers (CBOs) would be required to provide optimum food aid support for worldwide emergency responses for the

foreseeable future. The rationale for this is explained in Part III: Resource Request, Workforce and Operating Expenses. Adequate human and non-food resources are needed to keep pace with the demand for rapid deployment of Title II emergency food aid to an increasingly number of complex humanitarian situations, such as the Kosovo crisis. If the requested human and non-food resources are not provided, the SO1 team projects that program deficiencies will continue.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SOI INDICATORS AND RESULTS TO DATE

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Indicators	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998 Result and Ratings on Indicator Targets	
SO1: Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met	Percent of targeted population reached by food aid	67%	74.4%	77.34%	Exceeded (target = 70%)
	Percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status of target groups	37%	62%	52.78%	Met (target = 50%)
IR1: Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations	Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting	53%	85%	87.50%	Exceeded (target = 55%)
	Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups	90%	67.5%	70.83%	Failed to meet (target = 92%)
IR2: Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule	Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages	30%	33%	47%	Failed to meet (target = 25%)
	Percent of proposals reviewed & cooperating sponsors notified of decisions within 21 business days of receipt. Note: This indicator was not tracked due to lack of staff resources	8%	37%	No info	No info
IR3: Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development	Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development (or relief exit strategies)	63%	73%	69.44%	Exceeded (target = 63%)
	Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design & implementation (“do no harm”)	60%	91%	88.89%	Exceeded (target = 70%)
IR4: Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors & Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs	Percent of ISG grants supporting emergency planning/evaluation	44%	Deleted	Deleted	N/A
	Percent of programs strengthening counterparts/local groups Note: Previously, “percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results”	93%	94%	86.11%	Failed to meet (target = 93%)
	Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements Note: based on questionnaire response. As in previous years, this does not include timeliness (i.e., within 30 days of reporting period). If timeliness is included, the result = 21.62%	17%	26%	56.75%	Exceeded (target = 40%)

Results of Selected Indicators

The SO1 team, in consultation with U.S. PVOs, selected the six indicators highlighted in Table 1 above. The six selected indicators are described in more detail below.

TABLE 2: SO1, INDICATOR 1 -- Exceeded Expectations

Percent of targeted population reached by food aid			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of targeted population	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	67%
	1997	67%	74.4%
Indicator Definition: "Targeted population" as defined at program start and stated in grant document.	1998	70%	77.34%
	1999	75%	
	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

In FY 1998, the SO1 team reached at least 16,485,299 beneficiaries through Title II emergency food aid, or approximately 77.34 percent of the population targeted by its implementing partners. The difference of 22.66 percent includes those not reached (18.17 percent) and those with no information (4.49 percent). The SO1 team applied this same methodology in previous years' analyses. The 4.9 percent with no information are a major improvement from last year's 21.3 percent. In terms of number of countries, data was not available from three countries. This is a slight improvement from last year with data missing from four countries, and considerable progress from the initial year FY 1996 report with data unavailable from seven countries. As part of its management-for-results efforts, the SO1 team seeks to improve data collection. This is being incorporated as part of regular reporting by implementing partners. Similar to last year, the SO1 team received 100 percent return on the R4 survey questionnaires from its PVO partners.

Implementing partners, primarily the World Food Programme (WFP) and U.S. PVOs undertook 37 programs (see Annex 1). Similar to last year, the majority of programs were implemented in Africa, then Europe, Asia and Near East, and then Latin America and the Caribbean.

Beneficiaries *reached* by region are: (a) Africa region: 8,411,780 beneficiaries (67.53 percent of targeted within region); (b) Asia and Near East region: 7,541,621 beneficiaries (96.73 percent of targeted); (c) Latin America and the Caribbean: 296,740 beneficiaries (94.81 percent of targeted); and, (d) Europe: 235,158 beneficiaries (31.40 percent of targeted).

Based on information received from some programs, beneficiaries included internally displaced persons (658,602), returnees/resettled (358,725), refugees (86,181). The majority of programs (70 percent) included targeted feeding as opposed to general feeding. Programs included food-for-work activities, food-for-agriculture, supplementary feeding, and therapeutic feeding.

In addition to the 16.4 million beneficiaries reached (above), the U.S. supported additional beneficiaries through the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) in 12 countries. The PROs that received U.S. Title II emergency food aid were implemented in Africa (Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda) and in the Asia/Near East region (Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan). The total number of targeted beneficiaries in these countries was 3,482,340. [Ref. *WFP Status of 1998 Food Needs, Contributions and Shortfalls, January 21, 1999.*]

In FY 1998, the U.S. contributed 217,120 metric tons of food aid, valued at more than US \$116 million for these PROs. [ref. *BHR/FFP/POD – FY 1998 PL 480 Approved Budget Summary Report.*] This represents 41 percent of the total tonnage (519,000 metric tons) and 36 percent of total value (\$319 million) mobilized by WFP from all sources for these worldwide PRO operations in 1998. [ref. *WFP Emergency Operations, January 20, 1999*]

TABLE 3: SO1, INDICATOR 2 -- On Track

Change (or maintenance) in nutritional status of target groups			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	37%
	1997	37%	62%
Indicator Definition: % of programs* reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status of target groups	1998	50%	52.78%
	1999	55%	
	2000	60%	
*Excluded programs that had impact indicators other than nutritional status.	2001	65%	

During FY 1998, over 52 percent of programs reported to have changed and/or maintained nutritional status of beneficiaries. Of this group, 78.95 percent of programs indicated that they are able to provide supporting reports or data. This is a slight improvement from last year with 71 percent of programs indicating they are able to provide supporting data. This year, for the first time, implementing partners provided nutritional data and survey results as part of the R4 process.

Nutrition data received from implementing partners are included in Annex 2. The example below illustrates the impact of emergency food aid on nutritional status of children.

In southern *Sudan*, the 15 year civil war has greatly affected the nutritional status of vulnerable groups such as children under five, and pregnant and lactating women. The situation deteriorated in 1998 with renewed fighting in Bahr El Ghazal region. Throughout 1998, the number of civilians at risk of death by starvation increased rapidly. The number increased from 350,000 in February to 700,000 in April, to 1.2 million in May 1998. The famine was exacerbated by poor harvests during the past two years. Some areas also experienced flooding from the heavy rains in 1998. World Vision, who collaborates with WFP, started its work in Tonj County in April 1993. This was in response to high levels of malnutrition. At the time, approximately 25 percent of children

under five were malnourished. In addition to food distribution to the general population, World Vision opened feeding centers for severely malnourished children. Regular surveys were conducted during pre- and post-harvest periods to assess nutritional status and assist in providing data on areas that may require additional food aid. This information was particularly important during the hunger gap period (April – August).

World Vision carried out a nutritional survey of children under five in Tonj County (November 1998) which indicated a global malnutrition rate of 18.3 percent. Although still high, this was an improvement from the 33.4 percent global malnutrition rate in May 1998. These results confirmed the observations made during the survey and the ongoing monitoring reports from the therapeutic and supplementary feeding programs. It is a clear indication of improved nutritional status. [ref. *Nutritional Survey – Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal Region, South Sudan, November 1998, World Vision/Sudan*]

World Vision undertook a similar survey in Gogrial County in Bahr El Ghazal. This was the second survey conducted in this area since World Vision started its emergency health interventions in January 1997. The main objective of the second survey was to determine

The emergency feeding program reduced malnutrition from 40.8% to 11.9% in seven months. *World Vision/Sudan.*

the impact of the emergency feeding program initiated after the initial April survey, which indicated very high levels of malnutrition (40.8

percent). The follow-up survey showed that the global malnutrition rate dropped to 11.9 percent. This reflected a very effective emergency feeding program. [ref. *Nutritional Survey – Pathuon and Toch Payams of Gogrial County, Bahr El Ghazal, South Sudan, November 1998, World Vision/Sudan*]

TABLE 4: IR1, INDICATOR 1 -- Exceeded Expectations

Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	53%
	1997	55%	85%
Indicator Definition: % of programs that undertake needs assessment semi-annually (only for programs of duration more than 6 months)	1998	55%	87.50%
	1999	60%	
	2000	65%	
	2001	65%	

In FY 1998, over 87 percent of programs reported to have instituted periodic needs assessments (or used secondary information from other agencies). This Intermediate Result seeks to ensure that food aid is effectively used and provided to the most vulnerable groups.

In *Bulgaria*, the socio-economic crisis has particularly affected the lives of the elderly. They have little chance of resuming any meaningful economic activities to increase self-sufficiency. American Red Cross is sharing its information on this population group with

UNDP and its local partners. This comprehensive information on vulnerable groups influenced government policy. Due to these monitoring reports, elderly pensioners received modest pension increases.

In *North Korea*, for the third consecutive year, an FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment in November 1998 confirmed a food import gap of over one million tons of cereals for the next twelve-month period. The emergency food aid program is now focusing on a longer-term strategy, which will continue to address the most vulnerable groups, and also improve agricultural productivity and family food security through food-for-work activities. Vulnerable groups being targeted are children aged six months to ten years, as well as pregnant women and nursing mothers, and hospital patients. [ref. *WFP Regional Updates*]. Five U.S. PVOs, led by CARE, monitored the U.S. Government contribution of Title II emergency food aid implemented by WFP.

TABLE 5: IR3, INDICATOR 1 -- Exceeded Expectations

Percent of programs that developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development or relief exit strategies			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	63%
	1997	63%	73%
Indicator Definition: % of programs that plan <u>and</u> implement plans	1998	63%	69.44%
	1999	75%	
	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

Over 69 percent of programs reported to have incorporated resettlement or rehabilitation strategies. Program impact of these activities is illustrated in the following case studies and in Annex 2. Most importantly, people's lives are positively impacted.

In *Liberia*, security remained relatively stable throughout 1998, allowing large numbers of IDPs and refugees to resettle in their original towns and villages. The impact of the food distribution was twofold. Given that most residents were returnees, the availability of the commodities succeeded in bridging the food security gap in the targeted communities. The commodities also served as an inducement for voluntary return of the displaced population to their home communities. This is verified by the termination of food assistance to Kakata and Buchanan shelters by the close of January 1998. These shelters were physically emptied, with continued closure of the camps after March 1998, and the registration of IDP cardholders at the resettlement food distribution sites.

The Liberian civil war left much of the country's infrastructure in ruins. CRS provided food-for-work rations as incentives to staff of medical and educational institutions and to community workers as incentives for community rehabilitation activities. During nine months in 1998, CRS distributed food to 11,600 persons employed in medical institutions and schools. It also provided food to workers engaged in repair of rural infrastructures

such as market roads, bridges, schools, and clinics. The food distribution improved the attendance of medical staff and teachers, as indicated by community infrastructure assessments and attendance logs at health and educational facilities. This activity succeeded in restaffing health and welfare institutions to about 80 percent of their pre-war levels and improved the quality of services provided to vulnerable people.

In 1998, CRS provided food-for-work to 120,127 persons to rehabilitate an estimated 1,000 miles of feeder roads, 100 bridges, 10 schools, and 10 small infrastructures. It facilitated regular staff attendance at over 159 health and welfare institutions and 247

9,000 IDPs in Kakata and Buchanan successfully resettled in their areas of origin by the close of February 1998. *CRS/Liberia*.

schools, as indicated by the attendance logs at each institution. During the first and second quarters of 1998, CRS targeted urban schools and schools found along principal

highways. The opening of roads to the interior led to an increased number of rural schools during the third and fourth quarters so that over 50 percent of the program schools are now located in rural villages. This is also due to efforts of returning refugees and IDPs to re-establish schools in their resettled communities.

Title II food assistance encouraged many war-affected youths to enroll and attend the vocational training programs. However, the existing high unemployment in Liberia inhibited graduates from obtaining jobs or establishing small businesses individually or as cooperatives. During 1998, of the 38,009 youths who enrolled in 22 vocational training institutions in project areas, only 19,924 graduated. Of this, only 25 percent found employment, per institute records. However, informal field assessments of institution graduates indicated a reduced chance of their returning to violence as compared with non-graduates or non-enrolled.

In *Uganda*, the outcome of the one-year World Vision project has demonstrated that it is possible to apply development approaches even in camp situations when the right methods and approaches are employed. The project found that ongoing training of farmers through a network of extension staff and contact farmers is more effective in carrying out extension services than “single short”, periodic training. Demonstration field days were also effective. This increased awareness, created a competitive spirit among the farmers, and gave recognition and motivation to farmers who performed well. Women were found to be more receptive and adoptive of new methodologies introduced.

Transitional activities were undertaken to increase food production, improve access to markets, and enhance local capacities of farmers. These will enable IDPs to be more self-sufficient in food production and less reliant on relief support. Program activities included the provision of improved seeds and tools, and demonstration and extension of improved farming technologies. Activities also included marketing of non-traditional cash crops by strengthening marketing links and systems, and capacity building of farmers’ associations.

As a result of these activities, there was a marked increase in yields, food production, and food security at the household level. 1,701 households adopted improved agricultural practices. There was an increase of about 35 percent in prices of beans and maize for the farmers. All beneficiaries had adequate food stock and surpluses for marketing. Food distribution was suspended. As a result of extension services, there was increased production of rice and other food crops, including those not directly targeted by the project. In Pabbo, for example, there was a bumper rice harvest because of improved farming methods. As a result, the rice traders from Gulu and other areas flocked to Pabbo. This provided even more additional income to the farmers.

There was an increased amount of disposable income among the beneficiaries. A total of \$140,000 was injected into the local rural economy, which for a remote setting is considerable. Unstructured household surveys revealed investment of income into shelter improvement, bicycles, mattresses, radios and clothing. A number of farmers opened up accounts in local banks in Gulu to bank their earnings from the marketing of crops. There was increased food supply to urban markets and trading centers, and beneficiaries supplemented their diet with animal protein.

TABLE 6: IR3, INDICATOR 2 -- Exceeded Expectations

Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (“do no harm”)			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	60%
	1997	65%	91%
Indicator Definition: % of programs that meet criteria below in design and implementation.	1998	70%	88.89%
	1999	75%	
Programs that include: (a) An exit strategy which supports community stabilization = 55.56% (of all programs) (b) Local capacity building, beneficiary participation = 72.22% (c) Not undermining local agricultural production or local markets = 72.22% (d) Integration with development assistance = 55.56% (e) Gender and ethnic equity based on need (assumption: this is culturally acceptable and does not endanger safety) = 80.56% (f) Impartial and neutral distribution network = 66.67% (g) Other = 5.56%	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

Over 88 percent of programs reported to have incorporated “do no harm” criteria in program design and implementation. The principal areas were in gender and ethnic equity, local capacity building and participation of beneficiaries in program design and implementation, and the effort not to undermine local agricultural production or local markets. Gender and ethnic equity, ranked lowest last year, is now the priority area being addressed.

In *Sudan*, post-harvest assessments are conducted in order to ascertain the number of months that relief food cut (graduation) can be instigated in each corridor. This is based on the success of the harvest as a result of the seeds and tools program. CRS successfully worked with the communities to reduce rations. This led to the graduation of long-term relief food beneficiaries and established the basis for an exit strategy.

The seeds and tools project encompasses local capacity building through ongoing training to all members of the community regardless of race or sex. In addition, 1998/99 was the first year since the program commenced that local farmers were able to supply their excess local seeds to less successful farmers in the area. This has been significant in that production of local seed has a greater adaptability to local conditions and promotes local agricultural activity. Further, approximately five metric tons of local seeds produced were sold to an international NGO and exported. This built local IDP capacity for self-reliance.

Land cultivated increased by 205% in Kwanza Norte and by 43% in Malange in FY 1998 compared to FY 1997.
World Vision/Angola.

In *Angola*, World Vision promotes local capacity building and beneficiary participation.

Technicians and extension agents worked with leader farmers in communities, training them on the job in farming system practices and seed production techniques. This resulted in a 195 percent increase for maize, and a 57 percent increase for beans in FY 1998 compared to FY 1997 levels in the three project provinces. In addition, 31 tons of bean seed, 13 tons of cowpeas, and 28 tons of maize seed were produced and sold to World Vision by farmers.

TABLE 7: IR4, INDICATOR 2 -- Met Expectations

Percent of programs strengthening counterparts/local groups			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	93%
Indicator Definition: Collaborative activities:	1997	93%	94%
(a) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from cooperating sponsors = 63.89% (of all programs)	1998	93%	86.11%*
(b) Joint activities with local host entities = 69.44%	1999	95%	
(c) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc. = 83.33%	2000	95%	
(d) Other = 13.89%	2001	95%	
*Note: This indicator was previously "percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results".			

Over 86 percent of programs reported to have strengthened counterparts and local groups. The majority of programs strengthened local counterparts through their participation in various activities such as needs assessment, beneficiary selection, monitoring and training. This is similar to last year.

Linkage to other donor or other USAID programs:

The majority of Title II emergency programs have linkage to USAID or other donor programs. In most cases, this contributes toward progress in achieving SO1.

One of the best examples is in *Angola* where collaboration and funding from Africa Bureau, USAID/Angola, OFDA and OTI complemented SO1 activities. The “Seeds of Freedom” project, coordinated by World Vision with the participation of other PVOs, including CARE, CRS, and SCF, made a significant contribution to the agricultural rehabilitation program. The provision of improved seeds funded by Africa Bureau complemented activities such as seeds and tools distribution funded by OFDA, and food-for-work funded by FFP.

In *Indonesia*, one positive overlap has been with the World Bank which sponsors cash-for-work that also targets the areas served by PVOs such as CRS and CARE. However, the overlapping of assistance with other international organizations has posed some difficulties in coordination. For example, WFP food assistance is channeled to poor villages through the Government of Indonesia. As the volume of food allotted to WFP is huge, the government decided to target all villages in many districts, creating overlap, as most of the NGOs are already operating in the region. Although there is a monthly coordinating meeting in Jakarta and at the district level to share information and discuss findings, overlap still exists.

PART III: RESOURCE REQUEST

Rationale for Program Resource Level

During FY 1998, the Office of Food for Peace (Emergencies) managed over \$481 million (\$481,924,700) of emergency Title II food aid. Over 921 thousand metric tons of emergency food aid was implemented in more than 22 countries, targeting at least 21 million beneficiaries. Compared with the previous year's portfolio, this represents an increase of 17 percent in the amount of commodities (781 thousand metric tons) handled, and a 19 percent increase in total value (\$404,126,100) of emergency food aid.

The trend has been a steady increase in intensities of emergencies requiring extensive human resource efforts. In the past year, FFP has had to address several natural and complex emergencies of gigantic scale, with enormous logistical and coordination challenges, e.g., El Nino, Hurricanes Georges and Mitch, and the Kosovo crisis. FFP anticipates a continuing and increased need for emergency food aid in FYs 1999 and 2000.

The current level of human and non-food resources available is not realistic to adequately manage the level or types of emergencies being faced today.

Performance and Allocation

SO1 is trying to cope with human and non-food resource constraints by establishing innovative measures to meet the challenges of timely food aid. These measures include: the introduction and institutionalization of a new standardized grant document to turn around request for assistance more rapidly; a longer planning cycle for complex emergencies which provides more flexibility for programs to address transition and relief-to-development needs; and, the pre-positioning of Title II food commodities at US ports for immediate loading in case of sudden-onset emergencies.

With shrinking resources, operating units dealing with non-emergency activities can prioritize among programs and activities. SO1 has no control over the numbers, magnitude or complexity of the emergencies that occur throughout the year. Additionally U.S. foreign policy and humanitarian assistance interests strongly influence the decision making process. Without the required resources, performance was negatively affected. For example, in the last R4, SO1 outlined specific areas requiring improvement during FY 1998 – FY 2000. These were:

- Improved monitoring and reporting, and more precise targeting by implementing partners:

Update: There was an improvement in nutritional data being provided, and SO1 performance indicators are incorporated in each grant agreement. However, reporting by implementing partners is not timely and yet to be improved. In particular, plans to work

more closely with WFP's standardized reporting format (for all donors) so that it meets SO1 performance measurement needs were postponed due to lack of human resources.

➤ Establishment of database and improved performance tracking system:

Update: The SO1 team recently established a performance monitoring database. However, part of the performance tracking system was not implemented as human resources were prioritized to addressing immediate needs of emergencies. The SO1 team cannot report on IR2, Indicator 2: Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 business days of receipt.

The SO1 team did not refine the "*PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting*" as insufficient staff was unavailable for this effort.

➤ "Telling our story" to the U.S. public with greater effectiveness:

Update: With limited human resources, "telling our story" can no longer be prioritized, although it is still important to SO1. The priority is ensuring that critical food needs are met.

Workforce and Operating Expenses

As SO1 emphasized in the last R4, the staffing levels are inadequate for a crucial U.S. humanitarian assistance program. In FY 1996, \$448.9 million in Title II emergency food aid resources reached at least 11.3 million beneficiaries through 30 programs in 18 countries. In FY 1997, \$404 million in emergency food aid was provided to at least 11.5 million people through 45 programs in 28 programs. This increased in FY 1998 to \$481 million in emergency food provided to over 16.4 million beneficiaries. The staff levels remained static.

Recently, the SO1 team reviewed its program portfolio and staffing needs in connection with recent discussions on options and alternatives for optimum management of overall food. The team concluded that, given the historically high turnover rate of staff and the frequent need for "surge" capacity for major emergencies, 11.5 full-time Country Backstop Officers (CBOs) were required to provide optimum food aid support for worldwide emergency responses for the foreseeable future. The SO1 team also reviewed regional outlooks for emergency programs which would require FFP support. The team reviewed programs which are currently receiving FFP assistance and which may require assistance in FY 2000. The outcome of the review was as follows:

In *West Africa*, it will be necessary to maintain engagement in Sierra Leone and Liberia as long as the current conflict continues, even if this engagement is limited to WFP support. The current situation puts into question whether it will be possible to advance as quickly under the transitional plans. Nonetheless, SO1 will continue to support transitional program planning. Because of the need for management oversight of a

growing number of non-emergency Title II programs by the regional USDH FFPO's, the SO1 team also will be called upon to undertake additional program actions that may have previously been resolved at the field level. The complexity of these programs requires a minimum of 2.5 persons.

East and Southern Africa regions are fraught with conflict and natural disasters. Despite the presence of field missions, the SO1 team must continue to review U.S. government policy, legislative requirements and mandates, as well as logistics and other donor responses for several complex programs. The expected movement of the FFP PSC in Kigali, Rwanda, to the BHR/Humanitarian Office in Nairobi should result in better program backstopping for Uganda, Kenya, Great Lakes, Somalia and flare-ups in Southern Africa. However, heavy staff involvement is required in Washington for the reasons described above. Conservatively, two full-time persons are required to maintain oversight of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia activities, augmented with part-time support. Another 2.5 persons may be required for Great Lakes (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda), Democratic Republic of Congo (ex Zaire), Republic of Congo, Angola, and the occasional Southern Africa emergency requirements. This requirement is in part dependent on the role and scope of duties worked out for the new regional BS-15 who, as we understand it, will be assigned to the Great Lakes region.

The *Former Yugoslavia* (Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia) has drained staff time. Although programs in Bosnia, Albania, and Bulgaria were scheduled for closing, the situation dramatically changed in early 1999. The Former Yugoslavia currently occupies in excess of four full-time persons' time, and this is expected to continue until the crisis abates. SO1 assumes no Russia programming and that Caucasus interventions would be through WFP, if at all. By the end of FY 2000, two persons may oversee these program areas.

ANE emergency food aid assistance is primarily in Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). All three programs are politically sensitive and are true humanitarian tragedies. At the same time, both India and Bangladesh are prone to both severe flooding and typhoons that cause widespread destruction, particularly of crops and homes, necessitating a food aid response. The current support for WFP programs in Nepal, Eastern Bangladesh and the periodic needs in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are not factored into this analysis. Based on the above, 1.5 persons are required to provide coverage in this region.

Hurricanes Georges and Mitch, on top of the El Nino patterns, resulted in FY 1998 and FY 1999 emergency programs in the Dominican Republic and *Central America*. Currently, 1.5 persons are fully engaged in supporting these programs. SO1 expects that unless FY 1999 brings similar disasters, staff oversight could be reduced to one half-time person in FY 2000. However, final determination of this staff level can only be made after assessment of the damage of the upcoming rainy season on the severely compromised infrastructure in Central America.

At this time, the SO1 Team is barely managing its responsibilities with the active support of BHR/FFP's institutional contractor. This support, however, is hampered by the requirement that the institutional contractor operates off-site and their computer systems do not have access to ours. The active country backstop role currently played by the institutional contractor combined with their limited access has resulted in inadequate attention to the administrative and general program responsibilities such as budgeting, reporting and performance and impact measurement. Funding for an additional program support person, enhanced consultant services and travel under the institutional contract is required.

To summarize, the SO1 Team requires 11.5 CBOs and additional institutional contractor support in order to provide the robust responses to emergencies desired by Agency management while ensuring effective management of Title II resources.

Requirements for Washington-based Country Backstop Officers (CBOs)

BHR/FFP management is requesting two additional full-time equivalent positions for the SO1 Team in FY 2000 and FY 2001. This requirement may be met through the provision of additional U.S. direct-hire positions or additional PSCs funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance or a combination thereof. Additional alternative remedies include the following:

- 1) a change in current legislation or in interpretation of current legislation to permit the financing of emergency PSCs in Washington as is already done in the field (see following section);
- 2) equivalent, enhanced institutional contractor support to the SO1 Team along with lifting current restrictions on computer access and the provision of space in the RRB;
- 3) enhanced institutional contractor support to the SO2 Team, freeing up additional USDH FTEs to be transferred to the SO1 Team.

Requirements for PSC Food Aid Monitors in the Field

The continuation of Title II program-funded PSC food aid monitors is required to manage food aid. SO1 anticipates that major emergency food aid programs will continue in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda (Great Lakes region). One PSC is needed in Nairobi to monitor the emergency programs in Eastern/Southern Africa. Another is needed for the Sudan program. Recent events in Kosovo may necessitate one full-time PSC food aid monitor for the region.

TABLE 8: TITLE II-FUNDED FIELD PSC POSITION REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCIES

PSC Positions	Planned Levels			
	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001
Kosovo	0	0	1	1
Angola	1	0	0	0
Greater Horn/Nairobi	0	1	1	1
Sudan	0	1	1	1
West & Central Africa	1	1	1	0
Rwanda	1	0	0	0
Total PSC Positions Required	3	3	4	3

Operating Expense Requirements

SO1 requires operating expenses (OE) for basic operations and USDH travel to respond to emergencies, coordinate effectively with other bilateral donors, and respond to queries from Congress and from other bureaus and offices. Emergency food aid responses are often undertaken where there is limited, if any, USAID field involvement, e.g., North Korea. Even when there is a USAID presence, missions often do not have humanitarian assistance objectives in their strategies. This limits financial and human resources for emergency responses.

This necessitates the need for regular monitoring by the SO1 team, which ideally should be at least two visits per program per year. Regular consultations are also required with our major partners such as UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP), international organizations (ICRC, IFRC), and the European Union.

TABLE 9: BUDGET FY 2001 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS

Development Assistance – Type of Support	SO1 Requirements (US\$000)
Administrative Support Contract	1,000
Institutional Support Assistance	1,000
Technical Assistance and Training	260
Total Development Assistance	2,260

ANNEX 1: BENEFICIARIES REACHED IN FY 1998 – BY REGION, COUNTRY & IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

Country	Partner	Targeted	Reached	Not Reached	No info
A. AFRICA					
1. Angola	CARE	93,393	93,393	-	-
	SCF	50,000	50,000	-	-
	WV	261,000	143,000	118,000	-
Angola total: 3 programs		404,393	286,393	118,000	
2. Cameroon	WFP	210,000	-	-	210,000
3. Kenya	WFP	1,545,741	1,471,831	73,910	-
4. Liberia	CRS	133,400	92,876	40,524	-
5. Niger	CRS	30,000	30,000 (actual: 30,330)	-	-
6. Rwanda Regional (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania)	CRS	6,000	5,566	434	-
	CRS	16,500	16,500	-	-
	ICRC	18,000	18,000 (actual: 85,000 on rotating basis)	-	-
	WFP	1,295,000	1,295,000 (actual: 1,399,817)	-	-
	WV	49,650	49,650 (actual: 77,699)	-	-
Rwanda total: 5 programs		1,385,150	1,384,716	434	-
7. Sierra Leone	CARE	350,000	330,000	20,000	-
	CRS	273,000	210,907	62,093	-
	WV	60,000	52,900	7,100	-
Sierra Leone: 3 programs		683,000	593,807	89,193	-
8. Somalia	CARE	120,000	120,000 (actual: 138,460)	-	-
	WFP	296,614	296,614	-	-
Somalia: 2 programs		416,614	416,614	-	-
9. Sudan	ADRA	82,460	54,242	28,218	-
	CRS	165,200	165,200	-	-
	NPA	64,930	64,470	460	-
	WFP	5,352,300	3,226,100	2,126,200	-
Sudan: 4 programs		5,664,890	3,510,012	2,154,878	
10. Tanzania	WFP	1,400,000	600,000	800,000	-
11. Uganda	WFP	246,000	-	-	246,000
	WV	13,610	13,531	79	-
Uganda: 2 programs		259,610	13,531	79	246,000

12. Zambia	WFP	322,845	12,000	310,845	-
AFRICA TOTAL		12,455,643	8,411,780	3,587,863	456,000
B. ASIA & NEAR EAST					
13. Indonesia	CARE	164,085	164,085	-	-
	CRS	125,000	84,323	40,677	-
	CWS	37,000	4,803	32,197	-
Indonesia: 3 programs		326,085	253,211	72,874	-
14. North Korea: 2 programs	WFP (& PVO monitoring)	7,470,000	7,288,410	181,590	-
ANE TOTAL		7,796,085	7,541,621	254,464	-
C. EUROPE					
15. Bosnia	ADRA	45,500	45,500	-	-
	ARC	55,000	55,000	-	-
	CRS	28,365	17,658	10,707	-
Bosnia: 3 programs		128,865	118,158	10,707	-
16. Bulgaria	ARC	100,000	97,000	3,000	-
	CRS	20,000	20,000	-	-
Bulgaria: 2 programs		120,000	117,000	3,000	-
17. Tajikistan	WFP	500,000	-	-	500,000
EUROPE TOTAL		748,865	235,158	13,707	500,000
D. CENTRAL AMERICA					
18. Regional (Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala)	WFP	313,000	296,740	16,260	-
CENTRAL AMERICA TOTAL		313,000	296,740	16,260	-
GRAND TOTAL		21,313,593	16,485,299	3,872,294	956,000
			77.34% of targeted	18.17% of targeted	4.49% of targeted

*List of food distribution programs from FY 1998 P.L. 480 Approved Budget Summary Report - Final, BHR/FFP/POD, 3 December 1998, verified with FFPIS shipping records.

**Programs approved in FY 1998, but implemented after August 1998 or re-programmed, will be reported in FY 1999 (programs in Albania, Bosnia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Serbia, Sudan).

ANNEX 2: Case Studies - received from implementing partners for the review of FY 98 performance.

Nutritional Status

ASIA

In *Indonesia*, CRS monitors the growth and nutritional status of over 12,000 children less than three years. Available data on nutritional status from five counterparts for the period August 1998 through January 1999 shows that 60.3 percent of children weighed improved, 14.8 percent maintained their weight, and 21.7 percent regressed. The remaining 3.2 percent are newly born babies.

UNICEF, WFP, and the European Union undertook a nutrition survey in the *Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)* in September/October 1998. The survey confirmed serious levels of moderate and severe wasting, or acute malnutrition (weight for height), affecting approximately 16 percent of children, aged six months to seven years of age. The results also showed moderate and severe stunting (height for age), or chronic malnutrition, affecting about 62 percent of all children surveyed, while the prevalence of moderate and severe underweight (weight for age), was approximately 61 percent. The age and sex distribution shows that the prevalence of wasting peaks in the age range 12 to 24 months, before and after which it is less. However, stunting and underweight continue to rise through the fourth year and do not decline. The whole population of children seems to have been affected by the food shortage crisis. [*ref. Nutrition Survey of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Report by the EU, UNICEF and WFP of a study undertaken in partnership with the Government of DPRK, November 1998.*]

AFRICA

In *Angola*, the MSF Belgium nutrition survey (September 1998) indicated about 8 percent severe malnutrition among children in SCF project areas. The follow-up survey indicated 5 percent. *World Vision* targets 55,688 children less than five years of age and the malnourished. The program contributed to change in overall beneficiaries and specific groups. The number of children who recuperated in the nutrition feeding center increased, and there was a decreased rate of admissions to the center. There was a decrease in severe acute malnutrition in areas such as Lucala (Kwanza Norte) among the resident population. The program was linked to nutritional health education and primary health care activities that reduced the morbidity rate, as well as to agriculture inputs and training that improved food production and household food security.

World Vision conducted nutrition surveys in project sites (Samba Caju, Lucala, Ndalatando, Dange Ya Menha, Calulo) from February 1997 to August 1998. The results fall within acceptable margins and require continued nutritional vigilance. However, in Samba Caju (global acute malnutrition rate of 10.48 percent, survey of February 1997) and in Lucala (among recently displaced population, global acute malnutrition rate of

21.15 percent, survey of August 1998) the results showed nutritional calamity and required some immediate intervention. World Vision opened a nutritional rehabilitation center in Samba Caju that remained open until the end of December 1997 when there was a marked reduction in admissions to the center. In Lucala, since the opening of a nutritional rehabilitation center was not possible due to lack of resources, a general food distribution was undertaken during the month of September. This did not continue due to insufficient funding. There is remaining concern for this population as for many others where the number of displaced persons has been increasing.

In the World Vision project area, underweight children averaged at a rate of 46 percent over the course of FY 1998. These malnourished children showed remarkable improvements after four to eight weeks of supplemental feeding. The intervention included basic curative care (primarily for malaria and diarrhea), de-worming, micronutrient supplementation (including vitamin A), nutrition and health education (emphasizing breastfeeding), and provision of high-energy protein biscuits (supplied by Australia). Evaluation was undertaken on a weekly basis. 50,000 growth monitoring consults were conducted throughout the year for children under three years of age. Growth monitoring data was shared with the World Vision agriculture and commodity teams to improve targeting of zones (for seeds, tools, food-for-work) where higher levels of underweight/faltering children were being encountered.

A total of 882 acutely malnourished children were treated in therapeutic feeding centers during FY 1998 (compared to 8,187 in 1994). Feeding centers had a performance rate of 93 percent, that is children who graduated from the program. The discharge criteria were: sustained increase in the weight of the child (above two standard deviations); adequate knowledge on the mother's part of the child's problem and how to prepare food and care for the child in the home; and lack of associated medical problems on the child's part. Follow-up medical examination took place one month after discharge. One percent of admissions resulted in death, and the remaining six percent of patients either abandoned the program before completion or were referred due to presence of underlying chronic disease requiring additional treatment. [ref. *World Vision/Angola*]

In *Liberia*, nutritional assessments were regularly conducted in 1998 by Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), and other nutritional agencies in CRS operational area. At the beginning of 1998, malnutrition was at 7 to 13 percent with severe malnutrition at 1.3 to 2.8 percent. These figures dropped considerably in the major part of 1998. During the first half of the reporting period, the number of therapeutic feeding beneficiaries per month averaged 3,273, a high figure likely due to closure of IDP shelter feeding in early 1998. However, during the second half of the year, admittance fell to an average of 2,465 per month, attributed to improved food security and an increase in resettlement activities. There were still recorded instances of malnutrition among poorer families in some areas. During 1998, 305 metric tons of Title II food commodities were provided to 34,428 under-five malnourished children registered with ACF and MSF in Bong, Rivercess, Grand Bassa, and Montserrado counties. [ref. *CRS Liberia*]

CARE Sierra Leone reports that after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regime was removed from power in Freetown, in February 1998, they occupied parts of the Koinadugu and the diamond-rich Kono Districts. Almost 90 percent of those displaced went on to Masingbi, a town with a population of 4,000 bordering the two affected districts. This led to a major humanitarian crisis and acute human suffering. There was a high mortality rate and malnutrition among the IDPs.

CARE intervened by targeting these vulnerable groups with food distribution and health activities. The security situation in the area was fluid as rebels were using hit and run tactics in and around Masingbi, and the population in need of camp shelter increased to 41,000. Based on a joint assessment (ACF/ICRC/CARE) in September, the general ration scale was revised, and supplementary dry ration provided. Nutritional status improved and mortality rate dropped significantly [*ref. CARE/Sierra Leone*]

CRS reported that therapeutic rations by themselves met special nutritional needs, and supplementary rations, when combined with other sources, also met nutritional needs. The therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding projects improved nutritional status (ACF, MSF, KDDI and Cause Canada data). The other programs such as the safety net, urban youth, food-for-agriculture, food-for-work and food-for-training maintained nutritional status. [*ref. CRS Sierra Leone*]

In *Sudan*, global malnutrition rates dropped from 25.9 to 16.1 percent while non-camp average declined from 12.6 to 10.4 percent in the ADRA project areas. Per ADRA, this trend is due to the strategy of targeting children and their mothers, plus the continued use of WSB-based pre-mix, and the continued support to community health promoters. However, gains have yet to be stabilized. ADRA has realized that although it can be ascertained that food distribution to the target population has made significant impact on the nutritional status of the population, there are other factors equally impacting negatively on the nutritional status of the target population. These factors include: (a) Population instability – there is a continuous influx of new arrivals from the war zones, and continuous flow of the IDPs from the camps to the squatter areas and the settled areas. (b) Malnutrition is endemic among the IDP population in Khartoum State due to the lack of viable means of coping with “chronic emergency”. (c) Donor attitude – due to the attitude of donors toward the chronic emergency in Khartoum, a majority of NGOs are only engaged in delivering relief programs rather than rehabilitation and development to enhance the coping mechanisms of IDPs. (*ref. ADRA Sudan*)

ADRA/Sudan documented a significant difference in recovery time between malnourished children receiving treatment at a supplementary wet feeding center and those receiving dry rations. The mean recovery period was 177.4 days for children in a dry ration program compared to 51 days for those recovering in a wet feeding program. In addition, the wet feeding program (at \$17.88 per child) was more economical than the dry ration program.

Since 1995, the *Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)* has been responsible for distributing relief food in displaced camps in South Sudan. USAID provides the relief food distributed in displaced camps in Kajokeji and Yei counties, Equatoria region, South Sudan. NPA conducted a nutrition survey in their project areas in November/December 1998. Using weight-for-height of children under five, the survey found different levels of malnutrition from one area to another. In Kajokeji county, in Mangalore and Kerwa, for example, the level of severe malnutrition was 4 and 7 percent respectively, and moderate malnutrition was 22 and 16 percent. However, the level of severe malnutrition in Bamurye camp was nil with moderate malnutrition at 13 percent. The difference is explained by cultural practices in weaning, family size, availability, or lack of supplemental local produce and land for cultivation. In Yei county, severe malnutrition is lower compared to Kajokeji county at 1.8 percent in one site (Loka). Moderate malnutrition rates varied, with the highest at 7 Percent in Panyana camp. Anemia was found to be a common nutritional problem in the surveyed areas. It is most prevalent among mothers due to recurring pregnancies and poor feeding practice. (*Nutritional Assessment Report of NPA Operational Areas in Yei and Kajokeji counties, Equatoria Region, South Sudan – NPA/Sudan*)

Relief to Development

In *Rwanda*, the World Vision program is a great success within the farming community of Gikongoro. Yields improved dramatically and farmers, who initially thought of themselves as poor, now see possibilities. Crop yield in the project area is about three times higher than the average yields for the prefecture. They are achieving the highest productivity in the country. One of the farmers groups has been able to make enough money to purchase a light truck. One of the groups is made up of handicapped and vulnerable men and women. They were originally beggars. After the first season they obtained such a good potato harvest that their food insecurity problems evaporated. They told project staff “it is more profitable to engage in farming activities than to beg”. They were able to terrace and develop other lands outside the project area with the assistance of food-for-work. [ref. *WV Rwanda*]

In *Angola*, SCF provided food aid and sought to resettle 49,782 people. It succeeded in resettling about half of this population (25,540). The new outbreak of war has made it difficult to make further progress. However, in spite of the conflict situation, SCF activities have impacted on the lives of beneficiaries. A member of the Water Committee summarized the impact of the gravity project:

“The gravity water, which is now flowing into our village, has always been a symbol of purity, strength and healing in our homes. Our ancestors were attracted to settle here many generations ago because they were able to have access to this gravity water. Now, we have decided to come home to resettle in this village despite the political problems our country has seen. We feel that the water from the mountains is our healing power, source of courage and stability. All of you, who have helped us to repair the water systems, are our genuine allies

and your work will always remain in the daily memories of our people because you brought life and healing in the center of our village.”